미래 도둑

MADAM,
When Your Majesty visited the London School of Economics last November, you quite rightly
asked: why had nobody noticed that the credit crunch was on its way? The British Academy
convened a forum on 17 June 2009 to debate your question, with contributions from a range of
experts from business, the City, its regulators, academia, and government. This letter
summarises the views of the participants and the factors that they cited in our discussion, and
we hope that it offers an answer to your question.
Many people did foresee the crisis. However, the exact form that it would take and the timing
of its onset and ferocity were foreseen by nobody. What matters in such circumstances is not
just to predict the nature of the problem but also its timing. And there is also finding the will to
act and being sure that authorities have as part of their powers the right instruments to bring to
bear on the problem.
There were many warnings about imbalances in financial markets and in the global economy. For
example, the Bank of International Settlements expressed repeated concerns that risks did not
seem to be properly reflected in financial markets. Our own Bank of England issued many
warnings about this in their bi-annual Financial Stability Reports. Risk management was
considered an important part of financial markets. One of our major banks, now mainly in
public ownership, reputedly had 4000 risk managers. But the difficulty was seeing the risk to
the system as a whole rather than to any specific financial instrument or loan. Risk calculations
were most often confined to slices of financial activity, using some of the best mathematical
minds in our country and abroad. But they frequently lost sight of the bigger picture.
Many were also concerned about imbalances in the global economy. We had enjoyed a period of
unprecedented global expansion which had seen many people in poor countries, particularly
China and India, improving their living standards. But this prosperity had led to what is now
known as the ‘global savings glut’. This led to very low returns on safer long-term investments
which, in turn, led many investors to seek higher returns at the expense of greater risk.
Countries like the UK and the USA benefited from the rise of China which lowered the cost of
many goods that we buy, and through ready access to capital in the financial system it was easy
for UK households and businesses to borrow. This in turn fuelled the increase in house prices
both here and in the USA. There were many who warned of the dangers of this.
But against those who warned, most were convinced that banks knew what they were doing.
They believed that the financial wizards had found new and clever ways of managing risks.
Indeed, some claimed to have so dispersed them through an array of novel financial instruments
that they had virtually removed them. It is difficult to recall a greater example of wishful
thinking combined with hubris. There was a firm belief, too, that financial markets had changed.
And politicians of all types were charmed by the market. These views were abetted by financial
and economic models that were good at predicting the short-term and small risks, but few were
equipped to say what would happen when things went wrong as they have. People trusted the
banks whose boards and senior executives were packed with globally recruited talent and their
non-executive directors included those with proven track records in public life. Nobody wanted
to believe that their judgement could be faulty or that they were unable competently to
scrutinise the risks in the organisations that they managed. A generation of bankers and
financiers deceived themselves and those who thought that they were the pace-making engineers
of advanced economies.
All this exposed the difficulties of slowing the progression of such developments in the
presence of a general ‘feel-good’ factor. Households benefited from low unemployment, cheap
consumer goods and ready credit. Businesses benefited from lower borrowing costs. Bankers
were earning bumper bonuses and expanding their business around the world. The government
benefited from high tax revenues enabling them to increase public spending on schools and
hospitals. This was bound to create a psychology of denial. It was a cycle fuelled, in significant
measure, not by virtue but by delusion.
Among the authorities charged with managing these risks, there were difficulties too. Some say
that their job should have been ‘to take away the punch bowl when the party was in full swing’.
But that assumes that they had the instruments needed to do this. General pressure was for
more lax regulation – a light touch. The City of London (and the Financial Services Authority)
was praised as a paragon of global financial regulation for this reason.
There was a broad consensus that it was better to deal with the aftermath of bubbles in stock
markets and housing markets than to try to head them off in advance. Credence was given to
this view by the experience, especially in the USA, after the turn of the millennium when a
recession was more or less avoided after the ‘dot com’ bubble burst. This fuelled the view that
we could bail out the economy after the event.
Inflation remained low and created no warning sign of an economy that was overheating. The
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee had helped to deliver an unprecedented period of
low and stable inflation in line with its mandate. But this meant that interest rates were low by
historical standards. And some said that policy was therefore not sufficiently geared towards
heading off the risks. Some countries did raise interest rates to ‘lean against the wind’. But on
the whole, the prevailing view was that monetary policy was best used to prevent inflation and
not to control wider imbalances in the economy.

So where was the problem? Everyone seemed to be doing their own job properly on its own
merit. And according to standard measures of success, they were often doing it well. The failure
was to see how collectively this added up to a series of interconnected imbalances over which
no single authority had jurisdiction. This, combined with the psychology of herding and the
mantra of financial and policy gurus, lead to a dangerous recipe. Individual risks may rightly
have been viewed as small, but the risk to the system as a whole was vast.
So in summary, Your Majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis
and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective
imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the
risks to the system as a whole.
Given the forecasting failure at the heart of your enquiry, the British Academy is giving some
thought to how your Crown servants in the Treasury, the Cabinet Office and the Department
for Business, Innovation & Skills, as well as the Bank of England and the Financial Services
Authority might develop a new, shared horizon-scanning capability so that you never need to
ask your question again. The Academy will be hosting another seminar to examine the ‘never
again’ question more widely. We will report the findings to Your Majesty. The events of the
past year have delivered a salutary shock. Whether it will turn out to have been a beneficial one
will depend on the candour with which we dissect the lessons and apply them in future.

We have the honour to remain, Madam,
Your Majesty’s most humble and obedient servants
Professor Tim Besley, FBA Professor Peter Hennessy,FBA